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SHOULD UNNECESSARY WARNINGS WRAP A
SUSPECT IN THE PANOPLY OF MIRANDA

PROTECTIONS?
I. INTRODUCTION
When Alice followed White Rabbit down the rabbit hole, she transported herself to Wonderland, a world peopled by a vanishing Cheshire
cat, a tea-drinking Mad Hatter, a murderous Queen of Hearts and a set of
incomprehensible laws.' Similarly, when a police officer mistakenly gives
Miranda warnings, that mistake transports him to "Mirandaland" where he
finds himself subject to nuanced rules that shape his freedom to question
suspects.2 To further complicate the officer's plight, the mistake only
transports him to Mirandaland in some jurisdictions. 3 In other jurisdictions, he stays put, and in yet others, the mistaken warnings are just one of
many factors used to decide whether he goes to Mirandaland.4
An investigating officer is trying to unravel the people enmeshed in
a crime, separating victims, witnesses, and bystanders from suspects.5 In
the course of an investigation, the officer crosses a boundary and triggers
the need for Miranda rights, which transforms the landscape of his investigation into a minefield littered with danger. 6 The double-barreled trigger
1 LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND (New American Library
1960) (1865) [hereinafter Alice in Wonderland].
2 See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (listing safeguards triggered by combination of custody and interrogation). Before officers interrogate a suspect in
custody, they must warn him that he has the right to remain silent; anything he says can be
used against him in court; he has the right to an attorney; and if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided. Id. at 478-79 [hereinafter Miranda Warnings].
3 See United States v. Harris, 221 F.3d 1048, 1051 (8th Cir. 2000) (explaining circuit
split over whether unnecessary Miranda warnings transform non-custodial settings into
custodial settings). The Court explained that the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits construed
mistaken Miranda warnings as transforming non-custodial settings into custodial settings.
Id.
4 Id. The Court further explained that the Fourth, Fifth and Seventh Circuits ignore
mistakenly given Miranda warnings. Id. The Seventh Circuit used a totality of the circumstances test to decide if Mirandaprotections should apply. Id.
5 See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 171-72 (2001) (recognizing investigator's need
to talk to witnesses and suspects).
6 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 481 (acknowledging heavy burden police bear). "How
much harm this decision will inflict on law enforcement cannot fairly be predicted with
accuracy." Id. at 517 (Harlan, J., dissenting). "The social costs of crime are too great to

136

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY
[Vol. X 2005]

for Miranda rights is the intersection of interrogation and custody. 7 Exactly what constitutes either interrogation or custody is as difficult to hit as
a moving target; therefore, the officer can be on the wrong side of the
boundary and mistakenly give the warnings. 8 Once Miranda rights are
triggered, a false step can set off dangers that include the exclusion of the
suspect's incriminating statements from trial if any of the four warnings
are omitted. 9 For example, Oreste Fulminante confessed that he drove his
11-year-old step-daughter to the desert "where he choked her, sexually
assaulted her, and made her beg for her life, before shooting her twice in
the head."' 10 The confession could not be used at trial." The Fulminante
Court excluded the confession and ordered a retrial because the interroga2
tion that produced the incriminating admissions violated Miranda rules.'
This note maps the territory surrounding the Miranda boundary,
with particular focus on the divergent decisions that circuit courts have
made when a police officer gives warnings mistakenly. Our journey begins with the United States Supreme Court decision in Miranda v. Arizona
and the availability of the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination outside a trial.' 3 Next on the itinerary is a discussion of interrogation, where the court distinguishes "subtle compulsion" and "strategic deception" from coercion.' 4 Because the combination of interrogation
call the new rules anything but a hazardous experimentation." Id.
7 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-68 (stating custodial interrogations require warnings).
8 See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (defining interrogation as
more than express questioning). The Innis Court expanded the definition of interrogation
beyond express questioning to any actions by the police "reasonably likely to evoke an
incriminating response from a suspect." Id. See also Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520, 526
(1987) (expanding coercive police conduct to functional equivalent of express questioning).
If the conduct subjects the suspect to the will of his examiner, it is legally the same thing as
express questioning. Id.; see also Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994) (ruling
custody depends on objective circumstances not subjective views of interrogating officers
or suspect).
9 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479 (excluding from trial evidence obtained without
warnings).
'0 Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 283 (1991).
11 Id. at 302 (ruling coercive nature of questioning rendered confession inadmissible
for lack of Miranda warnings).
12 Id. (holding Fulminante entitled to new trial in which confession excluded).
13 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 (stating availability of Fifth Amendment privilege
outside of court proceedings). The "privilege" embodied in the Fifth Amendment provides
that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
14 See Innis, 446 U.S. at 303 (finding interrogation where police actions elicit incriminating responses but not where police use subtle compulsion); see also Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297-98 (1990) (explaining deceptive tactic employed to elicit voluntary
confession not violative of Self-Incrimination Clause).

DO MISTAKEN MIRANDA WARNINGS COUNT?
and custody triggers the need for Miranda warnings, this paper visits the
meaning of "custody" and unravels the apparent contradictions of a prison
inmate, who is not in custody, while a suspect questioned in his own home
is in custody. 15 With the foundation laid, the paper explores the circuit
courts' reasoning for divergent results, including the court-imposed consequences when an officer gives gratuitous warnings. 1 6 This paper concludes
that mistaken warnings should be ignored, because police officers are
bombarded by enough danger to preclude hair-splitting decisions. That
leaves everyone back where they started, like Alice waking from her
dream. 17
II. MIRANDA
"Oh my dear paws! Oh my fur and whiskers! She'll get me
executed, as sure as ferrets are ferrets." said the White Rabbit.' 8
Most people would recognize the White Rabbit's exclamations as
fear of the Queen of Heart's penchant for lopping off heads. 19 Even more
people would recognize and can even chant the four-warning mantra of
Miranda by heart. 20 In fact, Miranda warnings are so ingrained in American culture that it is difficult to recapture the immense controversy that the
original five-to-four ruling engendered. 2 1 Justice Harlan's vehement dissent reproached the majority, saying these new rules are being "imposed
over widespread objection, at the very time when judicial restraint is most
called for by the circumstances. 22 The controversy has withstood the test
of time and nearly forty years later still rages for Justice Scalia, who described the ruling in Miranda as "objectionable," the reasoning as "prepos15 See United States v. Conley, 779 F.2d 970, 973-74 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding handcuffed prison inmate not in custody for purposes of Miranda warnings); see also Orozco v.
Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 326-27 (1969) (holding suspect in custody although in his own bedroom).

16 See United States v. Harris, 221 F.3d 1048, 1051 (8th Cir. 2000) (listing divergent
decisions in different circuits in response to unnecessary warnings).
17 Alice in Wonderland, supra note 1, at 115.
18 Alice in Wonderland, supra note 1, at 38.
19 Alice in Wonderland, supra note 1, at 77.
20 Miranda Warnings, supra note 2.

21 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (striking down federal
law in part because Miranda warnings are embedded in our culture). "Miranda has become
embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of
our national culture." Id.; see also Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 331-32 (1999)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (acknowledging doctrines with "wide acceptance in the legal culture"
provide reason not to overrule cases).
22 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 505 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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terous" and the presumptions as without support in "history, precedent, or
common sense." 23 Despite Justice Harlan's past protests, Justice Scalia's
present objections and the United States Congress'
24 attempts to supersede
the ruling by federal law, Miranda is still with us.
The best way to understand the failure of the opposition in the
Miranda debate is to focus on the goals of the majority: to eradicate physical force as a tool of in-custody interrogation and to eliminate the psychological coercion brought on by isolation and intimidation.25 The Court
intended that the warnings and waiver regimen protect witnesses and suspects during questioning because, in its words, this nation cherishes the
principle that "the individual may not be compelled to incriminate himself., 26 To demonstrate the potential for abuse, the Miranda majority
quoted police interrogation manuals that instructed investigators: "the principal psychological factor contributing to a successful interrogation is privacy - being alone with the person under interrogation.", 27 Because interrogations are as private as "black boxes," the inside workings of which the
public and juries never see, the Court imposed a severe penalty to ensure
that the suspect is warned that he can sit silently and refuse to answer questions.28 If the police deviate from the straight and narrow and withhold
23

See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 448 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating objections to ruling

in Miranda). "Miranda was objectionable for innumerable reasons, not least the fact that
cases spanning more than 70 years had rejected its core premise .... Moreover, history and
precedent aside, the decision in Miranda, if read as an explication of what the Constitution
requires, is preposterous." Id. The idea that Miranda-violative admissions are necessarily
involuntary "can claim no support in history, precedent, or common sense, and as a result
would at least presumptively be worth reconsidering even at this late date." Id. at 450.
24 See id. at 432 (explaining Acts of Congress cannot effectively overrule Supreme
Court decisions on Constitutional matters). Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2003) in
1968, which made voluntary statements admissible even if they were elicited without
Miranda warnings. Id. The Dickerson Court invalidated the law. Id. "Whether or not we
would agree with Miranda'sreasoning and its resulting rule, were we addressing the issue
in the first instance, the principles of stare decisis weigh heavily against overruling it now."
Id. at 443 (upholding Miranda decision).
2 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 446 (describing brutality in which police beat, kicked and
burned witness with cigarette butts); id. at 448 (recognizing coercion can be mental as well
as physical).
26 Id. at 457-58 (describing incommunicado interrogation at odds with
protection
from self-incrimination); see also George C. Thomas III, The End of the Road for Miranda
v. Arizona?: On the History and Future of Rules for Police Interrogation, 37 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1, 9 (2000) (replacing voluntariness test with warnings and waiver) [hereinafter End of
the Road].
27 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 449 (quoting INBAU & REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND
CONFESSIONS 1 (1962)) (condemning instructions from police manuals as coercive).
28 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-79 (describing necessary procedural safeguards including warning of right to remain silent). The Court stated, "unless and until such warnings
and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of
interrogation can be used against him." Id.

DO MISTAKEN MIRANDA WARNINGS COUNT?

warnings, the prosecutor can not use the final goal of the interrogation, a
confession or incriminating statement, at trial.2 9
While the underpinnings of Miranda are found in the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, even a yawning stretch
will not find the right to an attorney in the Constitutional wording: no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.",30 Stretching yet again is required to expand the meaning of "criminal
case" (which is normally confined to formal, adversarial proceedings such
as a bail hearing, arraignment or trial) to include so preliminary a process
as the interrogation of a witness. 31 While the police depend on that very
interrogation to scoop the ultimate defendant out of the pool of possibilities, the scooped individual is a hooked fish, with his every movement the
focus of intense scrutiny, his freedom reduced to being hauled down to a
police station and his dignity subjected to the shame and horror of arrest
and custody. 32 And there's the rub: balancing the sanity and security derived from getting the bad guys off the streets against our historic love of
and commitment to freedom and justice. 33 So the Miranda Court drew a
line in the sand with custody; if the person being questioned is not in custody, then Miranda requires no warnings.3 4
III. INTERROGATION
"And who are these?" said the Queen, pointing to the three
gardeners...
29
30

Id. at 479 (excluding evidence obtained without warnings and waiver).
U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Miranda,384 U.S. at 474 (requiring questioning to

stop if individual requests counsel). The Sixth Amendment only requires the assistance of
counsel in criminal prosecutions. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy ... the assistance of counsel for his defense." Id.
31 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 510-11 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (exposing linguistic difficulties with enlarging protection against self-incrimination to police station confessions).
"While the Court finds no pertinent difference between judicial proceedings and police
interrogation, I believe the differences are so vast as to disqualify wholly the Sixth
Amendment precedents as suitable analogies in the present cases." Id. at 513-14.
32 End of the Road, supra note 26, at 1 (describing suspect being jacked up and
hauled down to police station).
33 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 499-500 (Clark, J., dissenting) (praising police and disputing majority's derisive reference to police manuals). "The police agencies - all the way
from municipal and state forces to the federal bureaus - are responsible for law enforcement
and public safety in this country. I am proud of their efforts, which in my view are not
fairly characterized by the Court's opinion." Id. at 500. But see id. at 439 (explaining
necessity for procedures to protect individuals in custody from self-incrimination). "The
cases before us raise questions which go to the roots of our concepts of American criminal
jurisprudence." Id.
34 Id. at 477 (marking custody as beginning of adversarial proceedings and point
where Miranda safeguards become necessary).
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"How should I know?" said Alice, surprised at her own
courage. "It's no business of mine."
The Queen turned crimson with fury, and, after glaring at her
for a moment
like a wild beast, began screaming "Off with
35
her head !,

The beheading of Alice as penalty for an unresponsive answer was
only a tad excessive by Wonderland standards but stands in stark contrast
to the suspect-protective definition of interrogation the Court handed down
in Rhode Island v. Innis.36 In that case, police officers were escorting
Thomas Innis to the police station in a squad car after arresting him for
murder. 37 Innis had blown off the back of a cab driver's head with a
sawed-off shotgun. 38 Concerned because the weapon had not been recovered, one officer said to the other that there was a school for handicapped
children nearby and "God forbid one of them might find a weapon with
shells and they might hurt themselves. 39 Innis interrupted to say he would
show them where he had hidden the shotgun.4 ° In its ruling, the Innis
Court expanded the meaning of interrogation beyond express questioning
to include police behavior that is "reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response," such as playing on the sympathies or religious beliefs of the
suspect. 41 Then, in what caused consternation for the dissent, the Court
characterized the officer's remark as brief and offhand, amounting to "subtle compulsion" but not interrogation.4 2 Justice Stevens found this to be a
hair-splitting distinction and complained the majority needed a question
mark at the end of a sentence to recognize it as a question.4 3
To further muddy the waters, the police in Illinois v. Perkins not
only asked Lloyd Perkins, a prison inmate, questions without first giving
Miranda warnings, but also lied to him. 44 Based on a reliable tip from an
informant that Perkins had committed an unsolved murder, the police
placed an undercover agent in Perkins' cell to goad him into bragging.45
35 Alice in Wonderland,supra note 1, at 77.
36 Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301-02 (1980) (defining interrogation as more
than just express questioning).
3
Id. at 293-94.
38 Id.

31 Id. at 294-95.

40 Innis, 446 U.S. at 295.
41 Id. at 301-02.
42 Id.

43 See id. at 303 (concluding Innis was not interrogated). But see id. at 311-13 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (demonstrating phrases that are not questions can elicit responses and
amount to interrogation).
44 Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 294-95 (1990) (describing police tricks used to
illicit confession).
45 Id. at 294 (explaining Perkins' incarceration for unrelated crime).
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Though the agent clearly elicited the confession by playing on Perkins'
arrogance, the Court distinguished this "strategic deception" from the Innis
definition of interrogation on the grounds that Perkins did not know that he
was talking to an officer and, therefore, could not have been coerced. 46 So,
it seems Miranda forbids the police from plucking
at a suspect's heart
47
strings, but allows them to play him for the fool.
To investigate yet another avenue of possible police shenanigans,
using a suspect's wife as a dupe to interrogate without questioning, the
Court granted certiorari in Arizona v. Mauro.4 8 The facts:
Mauro and his family were eating breakfast when appellant's
seven-year-old son David began crying and screaming.
David was in the bathroom where he had been imprisoned
for several days by his father. Mauro told his wife that he
would make the boy be quiet. Mauro went into the bathroom
and forced a rolled child's sock and two cloths down the
boy's throat, thus suffocating the child. Mauro then went to
a bedroom and returned with a suitcase in which he placed
the child's body. As he left the family trailer with the suitcase, he told his wife to "pray." 49
Mauro pleaded not guilty by way of insanity, and testimony revealed that he had a long history of mental problems, that his mother was a
manic depressive, and that he had been hospitalized at least ten times.50
The state rebutted the insanity defense by playing a tape made at the police
station after his arrest in which he tried to comfort his wife and silence her
until they had an attorney, generally demonstrating sanity through his clear
and reasonable self-interest. 5 1 Mauro wanted the tape suppressed. 52 He
accused the police of allowing the meeting in order to elicit the incriminating words and behavior by playing on his tender feelings for his wife (a
remarkable idea considering his treatment of their 7 year-old son), a subter-

46

Id. at 305-06 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (defining police questioning as interrogation

and pointing to likelihood of evoking incriminating response as in Innis). But see id. at 297
(excluding ploys and deception from Miranda protection as neither compulsion nor coercion).
47 Id. at 301 (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (renouncing police conduct as deceptive and
manipulative but upholding ruling). But see id. at 304 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with ruling on several scores). "Because Lloyd Perkins received no Miranda warnings
before he was subjected to custodial interrogation, his confession was not admissible." Id.
48 Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520, 521 (1987) (questioning whether visit of Mauro's
wife constituted interrogation).
49 State v. Mauro, 716 P.2d 393, 395 (Ariz. 1986), rev'd, 481 U.S. 520.
50 Id. at 396.
51 Mauro, 481 U.S. at 523 (detailing prosecution's position).
52 Id. at 523.
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fuge amounting to interrogation and forbidden under Innis.53 The Court
ruled against Mauro because he insisted on talking to his wife despite police advice.54 The fact that the Arizona Supreme Court agreed with him
and the fact that the Supreme Court granted certiorari underscore the difficulty the average police officer faces trying to decide whether he is interrogating a suspect.55
IV. CUSTODY
Accused of stealing tarts, the Knave stood "before them, in chains,
with a soldier on each side to guard him; and near the King was the White
Rabbit, with a trumpet in one hand, and a scroll of parchment in the
other. ' '56 Although Miranda never promised suspects a trumpeting White
Rabbit flourishing parchment scrolls, it does require procedural safeguards
(the warnings) when interrogation combines with custody, because that
recipe contains '57inherently coercive pressures that undermine the suspect's
"will to resist.
For example, when the police questioned Reyes Orozco
in his own home about a fatal shooting following a bar fight, he succumbed
to the pressure of the interrogation and directed the police to the murder
weapon hidden in a washing machine. 58 Orozco claimed that although the
questioning occurred in familiar surroundings while he was sitting on his
own bed, he was nonetheless "in custody" and appealed his conviction on
the grounds that his custodial interrogation required Miranda warnings. 59
That definition of custody was a far cry from the Miranda Court's images
of an isolated inquisition in the bowels of the police station. 60 Nonetheless,

53 Id. at 523-25 (detailing lower court's finding where Mauro and wife's meeting
amounted to interrogation); see also Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-01 (expanding definition of
interrogation to include behavior "reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response").
54 Mauro, 481 U.S. at 527 (ruling Mauro was not interrogated).
55 Id. at 524 (discussing Arizona Supreme Court ruling); id. at 521 (explaining underlying issue in case).
56 Alice in Wonderland, supra note 1, at 101.
57 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966); see also Miranda Warnings,
supra note 2.

58 Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 325 (1969) (describing events resulting in discovery of murder weapon).
59 Id. at 326 (describing state's argument and Miranda view of coerciveness when
custody and interrogation intersect); see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 449-50 (describing
procedures from police manuals). "In his own home he may be confident, indignant, or
recalcitrant. He is more keenly aware of his rights and more reluctant to tell of his indiscretions or criminal behavior within the walls of his home. Moreover, his family and other
friends are nearby, their presence lending moral support." Id.
60 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 456 (describing coercive effect of "incommunicado policedominated atmosphere").
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Orozco succeeded.6' The Court agreed that four police officers crowded
into his bedroom in the wee hours of the morning created the requisite intimidation and, together with his arrest, constituted custody. 62 Orozco's
custodial interrogation in his home triggered the full protection of Miranda
warnings, which were not given; the lack of warnings forced the exclusion
of the garnered evidence, including the murder weapon, and the case collapsed.63 The dissent bemoaned extending Miranda beyond the station
house, but Orozco v. Texas is good law today
and the first step on the jour64
"custody."
of
boundaries
the
shape
to
ney
While Orozco extended the meaning of custody, interrogation in a
police station remained the benchmark until the Court in Mathiason v.
Oregon moved the bench and rejected the notion that questioning at the
station is always custodial. 65 Carl Mathiason came voluntarily to the police station, shook the investigating officer's hand, sat at a desk in an office, confessed to a burglary
five minutes later, and then left for home with
the officer's permission. 66 The Court found that throughout the question66

ing Mathiason was at liberty to leave, and therefore, not in custody.67 The
omission of warnings did not violate his rights and the conviction was
valid.68 An interesting tangent in Mathiason is the fact that the police lied
to him, falsely claiming they found his fingerprints at the scene of the
crime. 69 According to the Court, the deception was irrelevant to the question of custody, in apparent contradiction
of the Miranda Court's exposition and abhorrence of police trickery.7 °

Orozco, 394 U.S. at 327 (reversing decision below).
Id. (repeating testimony of police detailing arrest of Orozco).
63 Id. at 326 (stating necessity of warnings for custodial interrogations); see also
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479 (explaining exclusion of evidence as penalty for omitted warnings).
64 Orozco, 394 U.S. at 329-30 (White, J., dissenting) (explaining station house practices result in compelled confessions). "No predicate is laid for believing that practices
outside the station house are normally prolonged, carried out in isolation, or often productive of the physical or psychological coercion made so much of in Miranda. It is difficult to
imagine the police duplicating in a person's home or on the street those conditions and
practices which the Court found prevalent in the station house." Id.
65 Mathiason v. Oregon, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (explaining suspect at police station not necessarily in custody).
61
62

66

Id. at 493-95.

67

Id. at 495 (concluding no restriction on Mathiason's freedom to leave).

68

Id.

69

Id. at 493 (stating police made false claim to Mathiason).

70 Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297 (1990) (holding deception not coercive); id.

at 301 (Brennan, J.,concurring) (renouncing police deception but concurring with decision); Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495-96 (dismissing lie as irrelevant). But see Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 455 (1966) (condemning police deceptions). "The police then persuade, trick, or cajole him out of exercising his constitutional rights." Id. (condemning
police trickery).
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Having visited custody at home and at the police station, the journey toward a clear understanding of custody goes on the road, where Richard McCarty was stopped for driving erratically. 7 1 McCarty got out of the
car, had trouble standing, and actually fell down during the field sobriety
test, prompting the officer to ask him if he had been drinking. 72 The simplicity and obviousness of that question mask the fact that with one sentence, the police had subjected McCarty to an interrogation.7 3 By now,
alarms are going off, alerting for the indicators of custody.74 If the Court
deemed this routine traffic stop "custodial," then McCarty had been interrogated while in custody without the requisite Miranda warnings.7 5 The
Court began its review by acknowledging that traffic stops significantly
curtail the driver's freedom of action and usually impose criminal penalties
for driving off without permission.76 Distinguishing that detention from
station house custody, the Court went on to point out that most traffic stops
are brief, expose the officer to public scrutiny and typically involve only
one or two officers.77 The Court held those distinctions sufficient to afford

drivers the spirit of protection demanded by Miranda and ruled that
McCarty was not in custody.78
The last port to visit on the custody voyage is the Lorton Penitentiary, where James Conley was questioned in connection with the murder
of Otis Peterson, a fellow inmate. 79 Prison officials found Otis Peterson
collapsed in his cell from a fatal stabbing, followed a trail of blood, and
discovered a blood-stained knife. 80 The subsequent investigation revealed
that Conley had a two-inch gouge on his left wrist.8 1 Conley went to the
71 Berkemere v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 422 (1984) (describing McCarty as weaving
in and out on Highway 270).
72 id.
73 Id.; see also New York v. Quarles, 444 N.E.2d 984, 985 (N.Y. 1982) (excluding
response based on custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings), rev'd, 467 U.S. 649,
657, 659-60 (1984) (creating public safety exception to Miranda). The Quarles case provides another example of a one sentence interrogation: "After handcuffing him, Officer
Kraft asked him where the gun was. Respondent nodded in the direction of some empty
cartons and responded, 'the gun is over there."' Id. The trial judge excluded the response,
the gun itself, and records describing its purchase because Miranda warnings were not
given. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 652-53 (1984).
74 Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 326 (1969) (referring to Miranda Court's iteration
and reiteration of necessity of warnings and definition of custody); Miranda, 384 U.S. at
477 (describing custody as deprivation of freedom of action in any significant way).
75 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-79 (summarizing Court's demand for warnings for
custodial interrogations and penalties for omission).
76 McCarty, 468 U.S. at 436-37 (describing traffic stops as seizures even when brief).
77

78

Id. at 438.
Id. at 442.

79 United States v. Conley, 779 F.2d 970, 971 (4th Cir. 1985).
80 Id.

81 Id. (detailing facts of Peterson's murder).
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infirmary and upon returning, a corrections officer asked the handcuffed82
and fully shackled Conley if "you're up to your same old shit again.
Reminiscent of "Were you drinking?" for McCarty's traffic stop, the court
held that Conley had been questioned by an officer, and therefore, interrogated.83 Displaying what many saw as immense irony, the court ruled that
Conley was not in custody for Miranda purposes. 84 The court reasoned
that the entire population of a prison is not free to leave, and reduced the
question of custody for a prisoner to whether he was subjected to more
than usual restraint within the context of his incarceration. 85 Because his
restraints were standard procedure for transfer, the court ruled that his incriminating responses were not barred for lack of Miranda warnings and
could be used against him at trial.86
V. ANALYSIS
"The Queen gasped, and sat down: the rapid journey through
the air had quite taken away her breath, and for a minute or
two she could do nothing but hug the little Lily in silence. 87
Similarly, the rapid journey through Miranda, interrogation, and
custody may leave you breathless, but nonetheless, has laid a solid, if rudimentary, foundation from which to launch the next excursion: visiting
several circuits that have split over the consequences of mistakenly given
Miranda warnings. 88
The Reverend Eric Harris, pastor of a Baptist Church in Arkansas,
visited his church one night, "lit paper towels with a match," placed them
against the wall, and then went home to watch a football game. 89 The
church burned to the ground. 90 Although questioned by federal, state, and
local law enforcement, Harris admitted to nothing and several years later
moved to Oklahoma. 9' At the request of the FBI, who had followed his
Id. (explaining exchange between corrections officers and Conley).
83 See supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing McCarty's interrogation).
84 Conley, 779 F.2d at 974 (finding no custody for prisoner Conley).
85 Id. at 973 (explaining paradigm shift for discussion of custody in prison setting);
82

see also Cervantes v. Walker, 589 F.2d 424, 428 (9th Cir. 1978) (finding custody relative to
context and requiring added imposition on freedom for prisoner).
86 Conley, 779 F.2d at 973-74 (discussing standard procedures for prisoner transport
and ruling Conley not in custody).
87

LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE

132 (New American Library 1960) (1865) [hereinafter Looking-Glass].
88 United States v. Harris, 221 F.3d 1048, 1051 (8th Cir. 2000) (listing circuit decisions for mistakenly given warnings).
89 Id. at 1049 (describing events leading up to criminal investigation).
90 Id.
91 Id.
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movements, Harris agreed to take a polygraph.92 When he arrived for the
test, the FBI specifically informed him that he was not in custody and
could leave at any time.93 He signed a Miranda waiver, then took and
failed the polygraph. 94 At the end of the hour-and-a-half interrogation,
Harris said he would have something for the agents tomorrow but wanted
to go home and talk to a lawyer.95 In violation of the ban on approaching a
suspect after he invokes his Miranda right to counsel, but believing that
Miranda did not apply because Harris was never in custody, the agents
96
called him three hours later and arranged a meeting for the morning.
Harris confessed to arson at that meeting.97
Dubbing the predicament the "transformation" argument, Harris
claimed the Miranda warnings picked up his interrogation, lock, stock and
barrel, and transported it over the line into "Mirandaland." 98 He argued
that the trip transformed his questioning from one in which he was truly
"free to leave," into a custodial interrogation triggering the full panoply of
Miranda protections, including freedom from being badgered by the
agent's second call. 99 If Harris' argument had succeeded, the court would
have suppressed his confession to burning down the church, and the case
would collapse. °° Neatly sidestepping the issue, the Eighth Circuit extricated the case from the "transformation" pickle and focused on the fact that
Harris went home after the first interrogation. °1 The court noted that pro92 Harris,221 F.3d at 1049.
93 Id.; see supra notes 35-86 and accompanying text (discussing interrogation combined with custody).
14 Harris,221 F.3d at 1049; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966)
(describing waiver requirements). A "heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate
that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against selfincrimination." Id.; see Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 n.14 (1964) (requiring
waiver to be intelligently and knowingly given).
95 Harris, 221 F.3d at 1049; see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474 (explaining defendant's right to cut off questioning and to remain silent until attorney is present).
96 Harris, 221 F.3d at 1050; see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85
(1981) (laying down bright line rule barring re-approach after defendant invokes right to
counsel). "Edwards, having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made
available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or
conversations with the police." Id.
97 Harris,221 F.3d at 1050 (describing facts of case).
98 Id. at 1051 n.14 (explaining warnings transform non-custodial interrogation into
custodial) (emphasis in original); see also supra note 2 (listing Miranda warnings).
99 Id. at 1051 (instructing ban on re-approach accompanies invocation of Miranda
right to counsel); see also supra note 94 (explaining Edward's ban on re-approach after
invoking right to counsel).
1ooId. (banning re-approach); see Edwards, 451 U.S at 485 (concluding information
from second interrogation could not be used against him).
'1'Harris,221 F.3d at 1051-52 (providing lengthy explanation of limitations on Ed-
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tection from being re-approached is not without limits and ruled that even
if Harris had been in custody (without deciding if he were or not), the
three-hour break in that custody defeated his right to suppress the confession.102
Taking an entirely different tack, the Fourth Circuit zeroed right in
on the custody issue when elderly Myrtle Wilder was stabbed eight times
in the stomach, had her neck broken, her face bruised and scraped and her
wrists slashed.10 3 Several weeks after the murder, James Davis came voluntarily to the station, was questioned, left for a dinner break, and was
questioned again a few hours later.' 4 Davis and the officers talked in a
carpeted, air-conditioned conference room, and at both sessions he was
given full Miranda warnings and waived his right to silence. 10 5 Shortly
after the second session began, Davis said he did not want to talk about the
case anymore. °6 In violation of Miranda, the detectives persisted, and
when they showed him pictures of Mrs. Wilder's dead body, Davis became
visibly upset, started to cry, had to take several bathroom breaks, and told
the detectives that he needed
to talk about what happened.107 He then gave
08
them a full confession.1

The Davis court acknowledged that Miranda erects a wall of protection around a suspect once he invokes his right to silence. 0 9 It then tackled
the bone of contention in this and similar cases: whether Miranda protections were in effect, a question that hinged on whether Davis, and other
suspects, were in custody." 0 The court noted that Davis came to the station voluntarily, left to eat dinner, talked in the informal and reasonably
comfortable conditions of the conference room, and at all times was free to
leave."' Finding Davis was not in custody, and therefore, not protected
wards' ban on re-approaching). "The Supreme Court has suggested, in dictum, that a break
in custody defeats Edwards protection." Id. at 1051. The Harris court explained that at
least six circuits have adopted rulings consistent with the Supreme Court's dictum. Id.; see
also McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 177 (1991) (limiting ban on re-approach to interrogation without break in custody).
102 Harris,221 F.3d at 1051-53 (allowing Harris' confession into evidence).
103 Davis v. Allsbrooks, 778 F.2d 168, 169 (4th Cir. 1985) (concluding Miranda inapplicable because Davis not in custody).
104

id.

105 Id.
106 id.

107 Davis, 778
108 id.
109

F.2d at 170.

Id.; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966) (explaining suspect

can choose to remain silent at any time during questioning and interrogation must then
cease).

110

Davis, 778 F.2d at 171; see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477 (holding custody trig-

gers Miranda protection).
.. Davis, 778 F.2d at 171-72 (cataloging indicators of lack of custody); see also
Berkemere v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 441 (1984) (requiring restraints associated with for-
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from questioning
after invoking silence, the court affirmed his conviction
2
for murder."
In United States v. Bautista, romance turned deadly when David
Carrillo invited Michael Bautista to spend the night.1 3 Bautista knew the
offer was not a simple act of hospitality and responded to the sexual overture by hitting Carrillo in the head with a beer bottle and stabbing him
forty-eight times with an ice pick.' 4 The FBI investigated the incident,
brought Bautista to the police station, and, in what is now a familiar sequence of events, interrogated him while telling him he was "free to
leave."' 5 At one point in the questioning, the agents gave Bautista his
Miranda warnings, and in response, he invoked his right to silence and to
counsel. 1 6 The agent continued in spite of Miranda'sban, and as a result,
Bautista claimed his subsequent incriminating statements should be suppressed because7 the agent's persistence constituted a violation of the protective shield."
The Tenth Circuit took a course diametrically opposed to the
Fourth's focus on custody as the linchpin to decide whether the unnecessary warnings created Miranda protection." 8 Instead, the court honored
the spirit of Miranda and admonished the police for first warning Bautista
and then blatantly ignoring his invocation of the Miranda rights." 9 The
court reasoned that a suspect would be at the mercy of his interrogators if
the assurance that he could remain silent and have an attorney present were

mal arrest for custody); Mathiason v. Oregon, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (noting restraint on
movement amounting to arrest necessary for custody).
"12 Davis, 778 F.2d at 172.
113United States v. Bautista, 145 F.3d 1140, 1143 (10th Cir. 1998).
114Id.at 1143-44 (describing Carrillo's injuries and sexual overtone of invitation).
"Carrillo said, 'Come on, we'll have a lot of fun,' and made as many as four attempts to
grab his crotch." Id.at 1144.
115 Id. at 1143-44.
Id. at 1144.
117 Bautista, 145 F.3d at 1145 (describing Bautista's assertion that agent's persistence
116

violated Miranda); see also supra note 94 (explaining Edwards' ban on re-approach after
invoking right to counsel).
"' Bautista, 145 F.3d at 1150 (quashing government's assertion that issue centers on
custody); see also Tukes v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 508, 516 n. 11(11 th Cir. 1990) (describing
state's focus on custody as without merit). "The state contends that because Tukes was not
in custody when he was read his Miranda warnings, had he invoked his right to counsel the
police would have been free to ignore that invocation. The state's position is without
merit." Id.
119 Id. at 1151-52. "The coercive effect of continued interrogation would thus be
greatly increased because the suspect would believe that the police 'promises' to provide
the suspect's constitutional rights were untrustworthy, and that the police would continue to
violate those rights as they wished, regardless of assurances to the contrary." Id. (quoting
Tukes, 911 F.2d at 516 n.11).
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just empty promises. 12 Finding the agents' continued questioning of
Bautista amounted to coercion, the court suppressed Bautista's selfincriminating statements. 21
Larry Sprosty brought the gratuitous Miranda problem to the Seventh Circuit along with his conviction for plying two teen-aged boys with
22
alcohol, molesting them, and then taking pornographic pictures of them. 1
Armed with a search warrant and hoping to find the incriminating pictures,
123
the police converged on Sprosty's trailer where he lived with his mother.
The officers read Sprosty his Miranda rights then conducted an exhaustive
search of both the inside and outside of the mobile home, and eventually
found the photos. 24 Sprosty's mother claimed at trial that during the melee Sprosty asked her to call his lawyer, but an officer refused to let her. 25
Because the officers continued to interrogate Sprosty after the alleged request for counsel, the questioning that followed was a prohibited reapproach if Miranda were in effect. 126 The trial judge explained that to
invoke Miranda protections, Sprosty's request for a lawyer had to be made
to the officers, and asking his mother was not sufficient. 127 Because
Sprosty failed to convince the court that he had informed the officers, the
28 Sprosty was convicted and
trial judge refused to suppress the photos.
29
sentenced to five years for sexual assault.1
The Seventh Circuit chose the middle ground to decide Sprosty's
appeal. 130 It rejected both that custody was decisive and the notion that
mistakenly given warnings create custody and looked to coercion as the
portal to "Mirandaland."' 131 Using McCarty (previously discussed traffic
stop case) as a guide, the court identified factors to use to determine the
Bautista, 145 F.3d at 1151.
121 Id. (distinguishing initial questioning from subsequent questioning where proper
120

Miranda protection was afforded Bautista).
122 Sprosty v. Buchler, 79 F.3d 635, 638 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating facts of case).
123

Id.

124

Id. at 639.

125 Sprosty, 79 F.3d at 638 (describing Sprosty's mother's alleged attempt to call attorney). Ms. Sprosty asked the officer if she could call her lawyer and he answered: "hang
up the phone, shut up and sit down." Id.
126 Id.; see also supra note 94 (explaining Edwards' ban on re-approach after invoking
Miranda right to counsel).
127 Sprosty, 79 F.3d at 639 (ruling Sprosty, not his mother, needed to request an attorney, and officers had to know of the request); see also Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412,
422-23 n.l (1986) (rejecting burden on police to inform defendant of attorney's phone call).
When a suspect has requested counsel, the interrogation must cease ... [but] Burbine at no
point requested the presence of counsel, as was his right under Miranda to do." Id. (emphasis in original).
128 Sprosty, 79 F.3d at 638-39.
129 Id.

130 Id. at 640 (citing underlying purpose of Miranda as protection from compelled
self-incrimination).
131 Id.
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limits of custody, with mistakenly given warnings just one of many. 312 The
court listed other factors such as a person's awareness of his freedom to be
' 33
silent and looked for "prolonged, coercive and accusatory questioning."'
Also important to the finding was the degree to which the police controlled
the setting of the interrogation and, in particular, whether the person felt he
could interrupt and knew he could leave. 134 Applying these factors, the
court evaluated the totality of the circumstances to decide if Sprosty was
placed under so much pressure that he could not freely exercise his privilege against self-incrimination. 135 The court weighed the lack of handcuffs, the familiar surroundings, and the presence of his mother and her
phone access to the outside world, against the police dominance of the
scene with squad cars and several armed officers.' 36 The court
found
37
Sprosty's confession was voluntary, and therefore, admissible.
VI. CONCLUSION
"I don't quite know yet," Alice said very gently. "I should
like to look all round me first, if I might."
"You may look in front of you, and on both sides, if you
like," said the Sheep; "but you can't look all round
you 138
unless you've got eyes at the back of your head."'
Following Alice's lead, this paper looks "in front and on both sides"
to decide which circuit came up with the best method for dealing with
Miranda warnings given by mistake. The Tenth Circuit ruled that the
warnings must be honored even when given by mistake so that a suspect is
not duped. 139 While this approach protects defendants' rights, it overlooks
the reality of a Miranda setting. The suspect has been warned. He is fully
informed that he can remain silent, that he can sit still, do nothing. It is the
police who have their hands tied. While abusive station house interrogations still occur, the public's extensive exposure to the warnings, protec132 Id. at 641 (listing factors necessary for finding custody); see also Berkemere v.

McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 438-39 (1984) (describing traffic stop atmosphere as substantially
less than "police dominated"); supra Section IV, Custody (discussing custody in setting of
traffic stop).

"' Sprosty, 79 F.3d at 641.
134 id.
135
36

id.
Sprosty, 79 F.3d at 641-42, 647 (discussing issue of custody at length, then ruling

confession voluntary).
137 id.
138 Looking-Glass, supranote 85, at 176.
139 See Bautista, 145 F.3d at 1151 (ruling suspect would believe no requests would be
honored).
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tions, and subsequent remedies limit this risk. This exposure on television
and in movies and books counteracts the naivety or innocence that an unsuspecting suspect brings to a police interrogation and levels the playing
field so that he is less likely to incriminate himself.
The Seventh Circuit decision that coercion, not custody, secures
protection brings us back to the pre-Miranda 1960's.140 This Circuit uses a
totality of the circumstances test to discover if the suspect parted with incriminating evidence voluntarily. The strength in this approach is that the
trial judge weighs the specific facts of each case. The myriad particularities
of each situation are weighed against each other instead of using a rigid,
one-size-fits-all rule that does not fit all circumstances. While the approach is flexible, that is precisely its weakness. Neither the police nor the
defendants are pre-informed of the rules that govern their interactions.
Sometimes that works to the advantage of the police, and other times to the
advantage of the defendants, because justice is seen through the variant
eyes of the various judges sitting on a given day.
The Eighth Circuit sidestepped the transformation problem because
the break in custody in Harris made Miranda warnings unnecessary.141
The court foreshadowed future rulings as opposed to allowing gratuitous
warnings to transform non-custody into custody. 142 The Fourth Circuit
agreed and ruled in Davis that without custody there is no need for
Miranda protection. 43 While this view is the harshest for the suspect it is
also simple and clear, two elements that assist the police and keep them
honest. Simplicity also assists the suspect because he knows the scope of
his constitutional protection and can predict the outcome of judicial proceedings with more accuracy. Forearmed with knowledge, the suspect can
use that knowledge to ward off zealous police efforts in interrogation. This
approach provides the best guide for police and defendants who enter
Mirandaland.

Ann F. Walsh

140 Sprosty, 79 F.3d at 641-42, 647 (applying factor test to decide whether information
was coerced).
141 United States v. Harris, 221 F.3d 1048, 1051 (8th Cir. 2000) (rejecting transformation when Miranda warnings are unnecessary).
142 Id. "[W]e are disinclined to adopt the transformation argument as an extension
of
our Miranda jurisprudence." Id.
143 Davis v. Allsbrooks, 778 F.2d 168, 170 (4th Cir. 1985) (concluding non-custodial
questioning makes Miranda inapplicable).

